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Abstract
This paper addresses two questions: What accounts for the gender gap in labor-market
outcomes? What are the driving forces behind the changes in the gender-labor-market out-
comes over the period 1968￿ 97? It formulates a dynamic general equilibrium model of labor
supply, occupational sorting and human capital accumulation in which gender discrimination
and an earnings gap arise endogenously. It uses this model to quantify the driving forces behind
the decline in the gender earnings gap and the increase in women￿ s labor-force participation,
professional-occupation representation and hours worked. It ￿nds that labor-market experience
is the most important factor explaining the gender earnings gap. In addition, statistical dis-
crimination accounts for a large fraction of the observed gender earnings gap and its decline.
It also ￿nds that a large increase in aggregate productivity in professional occupations plays a
major role in the increase in women￿ s labor-force participation, professional-occupation repre-
sentation and hours worked. Although of less importance, demographic changes account for a
substantial part of the increase in female labor-force participation and hours worked, whereas
home-production technology shocks do not.
Keywords: Gender earning gap, Discrimination, Occupation sorting, Labor-market experi-
ence, Structural estimation of dynamic games, Dynamic general equilibrium, Adverse selection,
Ratchet e⁄ect.
1 Introduction
One of the most striking changes in the U.S. labor market over the last four decades is the signi￿-
cant decline in the gender wage gap in the 1970s and 1980s. The median gender wage di⁄erential
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1dropped from about 40% in 1968 to 28% by 1992 and has remained constant since. Accompany-
ing this decline were signi￿cant increases in women￿ s labor-force participation, hours worked and
professional-occupations representation. An important feature of the gender wage gap is its evolu-
tion over the life cycle as a function of labor-market experience. The gender wage gap is relatively
small when workers are young and it increases with workers￿age. In contrast, the gender wage gap
for workers who work continuously full time decreases with age. The bottom right panel of Figure
3 illustrates these facts. This paper addresses two questions: What accounts for the labor-market
gender gaps and their evolution over the life cycle? What are the main forces behind their changes
over time?
Theoretical models of discrimination have a long tradition in economics going back to the
seminal work by Becker (1971), Arrow (1972) and Phelps (1972). This literature can be divided
in two categories, taste-based and statistical discrimination theory. Taste-based discrimination
theory postulates that employers have a preference for one group. In the absence of impediments to
competition, this theory predicts that group-based earnings gaps cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
Statistical discrimination models emphasize that group di⁄erences can arise endogenously without
any ex-ante di⁄erences across groups or preference for one group (see Coate and Loury, 1993, for
this insight). This literature focuses primarily on productivity di⁄erences across racial groups (see
Moro, 2003; Antonovics, 2004; Altonji, 2005). Two exceptions are Baron, Black, and Lowenstein
(1993) and Albanesi and Olivetti (2009). The latter develops a static model of statistical gender
discrimination in which e⁄ort in the labor market and hours worked at home are determined
endogenously. The former is the ￿rst to formalize a statistical discrimination model based on the
di⁄erence in the expected turnover rate between women and men. It shows that if employers
expect women to have a higher turnover rate than men, then they o⁄er women jobs which require
less training and also pay less. Our paper, therefore, contributes to this literature by incorporating
statistical discrimination, as formulated in Baron, Black, and Lowenstein, into a general equilibrium
model with life-cycle labor-supply choices; this allows us to capture the evolution of the labor-
market-outcomes gap over the life cycle.
There is an extensive empirical literature on the gender wage gap (see Altonji and Blank, 1999,
for a survey). Most of this work describes the pattern of the gender wage gap and decomposes
it into: the gap explained by di⁄erences in observed characteristics and the residual, typically
attributed to discrimination. Although informed by theory, there is no fully speci￿ed behavioral
model explaining the existence of a gender wage gap and its evolution over the life cycle in this
literature. The exceptions are Bowlus (1997); Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2005); and Flabbi
(2010, forthcoming). Bowlus (1997) presents a static search model with no discrimination or human
capital accumulation. It thus attributes the entire gender wage gap to di⁄erences in unobserved
productivity between men and women. Flabbi (2010, forthcoming) adds taste-based discrimination
to the Bowlus (1997) model. Bowlus (1997) and Flabbi (2010, forthcoming) do not account for
the observed patterns of the gender earnings gap over the life cycle. Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia
(2005) develops and calibrates a partial equilibrium life-cycle model of labor-supply and fertility
2choice, explaining the increase in the gender wage gap over the life cycle with no discrimination;
it does not explain, however, the decline in the wage gap for workers who work continuously full
time.
There is a large and growing literature explaining the decline of the labor-market-outcomes
gender gap. This literature can be divided into two main groups: papers that examine the increase
in labor-force participation and hours of married women (see Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan,
2003;1 Greenwood, Seshardri, and Yorukoglu, 2005; Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos, 2008;
Albanesi and Olivetti, 2008; FernÆndez and Fogli, 2009) and papers that examine the decline in
the gender wage gap and the increase in women￿ s labor-force participation and hours. The work
closest to ours is Lee and Wolpin (2010); it develops and estimates a dynamic general equilibrium
model with separate demand and supply factors a⁄ecting the changes in the gender wage gap. This
paper, however, does not account for the role of discrimination in the decline of the labor-market
outcomes gender gap.
Our model includes three channels through which a gender earnings gap can arise: group di⁄er-
ences in preferences, group di⁄erences in productivity, and discrimination. We use the framework
to assess the importance of these channels in the observed gender gap in labor-market outcomes
and its decline over time. We demonstrate identi￿cation and develop a three-step estimator of the
model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ￿rst paper to estimate a dynamic signaling model.
The model consists of forward-looking workers and ￿rms. Each period workers make labor-
market￿ participation, occupation and hours-worked decisions. The supply side of the model extends
Mincer and Polachek￿ s (1974) and Polachek￿ s (1981) labor-supply model by incorporating privately
observed labor-market￿ participation costs. The demand side consists of competitive ￿rms that incur
costs of hiring new workers. As a result of the workers￿private information and the employers￿
hiring costs, the model gives rise to an adverse selection problem. Low￿ participation-cost workers
have longer employment spells, which makes them more pro￿table to the employer. Therefore,
employers use the observed labor-supply decisions as a signal of the worker￿ s private information.
This in turn provides incentives for workers with high-participation-costs to mimic the labor-supply
behavior of workers with lower-participation-costs.
The model gives rise to statistical discrimination. Suppose women, on average, have higher
participation costs. Then employers will expect them to have higher turnover rate than men, and
will pay them lower wages. We measure discrimination as the di⁄erence between the labor-market
outcomes of men and women under symmetric and private information. Thus, gender di⁄erences in
earnings that arise due to observed group a¢ liations are referred to as discrimination, as opposed
to gaps that arise due to di⁄erences in preferences and productive skills.
Several conclusions arise from the empirical analysis. First, private information plays an im-
portant role in women￿ s labor-market outcomes. As part of our empirical strategy, we test for the
presence of private information and ￿nd evidence for it. Second, human capital accumulated with
labor-market experience is the most important factor explaining the gender earnings gap.
1Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan (2003) allow for an exogenous gender wage wedge that changes over time.
3We conduct counterfactual experiments to assess the e⁄ect of di⁄erent factors on the gender
earnings gap, labor-market experience, and occupational sorting. We ￿nd that hiring costs amplify
the gender di⁄erences in preferences and skills and is the largest factor a⁄ecting the gender earnings
gap. Further, discrimination plays a big role in the observed gender earnings gap and its decline
over time. This ￿nding is in contrast to the results in Flabbi (2010) which ￿nds that taste-based
discrimination cannot account for the decline in the gender wage gap in the 80s and 90s. In addition,
we ￿nd that signaling is an important factor in labor-force participation: Women participate less
when information is symmetric than they do when it is private. Thus, in contrast to empirical work
on private information in the insurance market, we ￿nd that private information is both statistically
and quantitatively signi￿cant in the labor market.
The literature focuses on several factors that caused the changes in the labor market outcomes
of women relative to men between the 70s and the 90s. The ￿rst factor is skill-biased technological
changes that increase productivity in skill-intensive occupations. The second factor is a decline
in the cost of producing home goods. The third factor is changes in education level, marriage
and fertility over time. Our results con￿rm the importance of technology-biased productivity
and demographic changes (see Lee and Wolpin, 2010 for similar results). A comparatively larger
aggregate productivity increase in professional occupations accounts for much of women￿ s increased
representation in these occupations, labor-force participation and hours worked. Demographic
changes reduced women￿ s costs of participating in the labor market, increasing their participation
and hours worked. In contrast to Greenwood, Seshardri and Yorukoglu (2005), our results do not
support the hypothesis that changes in home production costs explain the increase in women￿ s
labor market experience and hours worked over the period we examine, but the time period in their
paper does not completely overlaps with ours. This result, however, is similar to the ￿ndings in
Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan (2003). Because the papers in this literature do not incorporate
discrimination, our main contribution to this literature is the ￿nding that changes in discrimination
accounted for about 50% and 40% of the change in the increase in women￿ s labor market experience
in professional and nonprofessional occupations, respectively.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents the
equilibrium analysis and the equilibrium labor-market gender gaps. The empirical implementation
is presented in section 4. Section 5 shows that the model is identi￿ed and develops the estimator.
Section 6 contains empirical results and counterfactual simulations. Section 7 concludes. The
appendices present proofs, implementation details, asymptotic properties of our estimator, and a
detailed data description.
2 Theoretical Model
The model we present extends Altug and Miller￿ s (1998) general equilibrium model of dynamic labor
supply and consumption. We incorporate occupation sorting, hiring costs and private information
into their framework. The hiring costs and private information give rise to endogenous gender
4discrimination as formalized by Baron, Black, and Lowenstein (1993) in a partial equilibrium model.
The economy consists of in￿nitely lived ￿rms and ￿nitely lived workers. There exists a contin-
uum of workers on the unit interval [0;1] in each age￿ education cohort. These workers are divided
into two observed gender groups, i 2 fw;mg, women and men, respectively. For notational ease,
we denote age and calendar year for each cohort by t (t = 0;:::;T). The theoretical model is
written and solved for a given cohort, but the economy consists of a number of overlapping cohorts.
There is free entry into the competitive labor markets. There are two occupations, ￿ 2 fP;NPg,
professional and nonprofessional, each consists of a continuum of identical ￿rms. Each ￿rm o⁄ers
one job in each period. The job o⁄er maximizes the employer￿ s lifetime expected discounted pro￿ts.
2.1 Workers￿Problem
Choice Set At each discrete time t, an individual of gender i makes labor-market participation
and occupation choices, deciding how many hours to work and how much to consume. Labor-
market participation and occupation choices are discrete, while hours and consumption choices are
continuous. We denote the participation decision by dt, where dt = 1 if the individual participates
in the labor force in period t, and 0 otherwise. The occupation and participation indicators are
de￿ned as I￿t(￿ 2 fP;NPg), which takes the value 1 if the worker is employed in occupation
￿ and 0 otherwise. Let 0 ￿ ht ￿ 1 denote the fraction of hours (normalized to be between 0
and 1) that the individual chooses to work. Denote the labor-supply decision vector by at =
(dt￿1;fI￿t￿1g￿2fP;NPg;ht). Finally, ct denotes the individual￿ s consumption.
Preferences Individuals have preferences over non-market hours, lt, and consumption, ct. non-
market hours are the di⁄erence between the total time endowment and the labor-market hours,
lt = 1 ￿ ht. Preferences are additively separable in consumption and leisure contemporaneously.
Consumption is additively separable over time, whereas leisure is not.
The other two time-varying vectors of individual characteristics that determine the utility as-
sociated with alternative-consumption and non-market-hours allocations are xt, which is a K ￿ 1
vector, and ("0t;"1t;"2t)0 which is a 3 ￿ 1 vector. De￿ne zt = (a0;:::;at￿1;xt) to be a vector with
the ￿rst t ￿ 1 elements capturing the dependence of the utility on the past labor-supply choices;
the last element, xt, is independently distributed over the population and evolves according to a
known group-speci￿c transition distribution function, Fi0(xt+1 j zt). The vector ("0t;"1t;"2t)0 is
independent across the population and time and is drawn from a population with a common dis-
tribution function, F1("0t;"1t;"2t). The distribution functions Fi0(xt+1 j zt) and F1("0t;"1t;"2t) are
absolutely continuous with continuously di⁄erentiable densities fi0(xt+1 j zt) and f1("0t;"1t;"2t),
respectively.
The current-period utility function at date t for an individual i is Uit,
(1) Uit = dtui0(zt;￿t) + ui1(lt;zt) + ui2(ct;xt;"2t) + (1 ￿ dt)"0t + dt"1t;
5where ui0() represents the utility cost of participating in the labor force, and ￿t is an aggregate shock
to this cost which is drawn from a distribution F￿(￿t+1 j ￿t). The disutility of working is indexed
by gender, allowing for possible gender preference di⁄erences. We assume the utility function is
concave, continuous, and twice di⁄erentiable everywhere in lt and ct. ￿ 2 (0;1) denotes the common
subjective discount factor. Individuals maximize lifetime expected utility: Et
hPT
s=t ￿t￿sUis j zt
i
,
subject to the budget constraint described below.
Budget Sets We assume that the assets markets are competitive and complete, and that there
are no frictions in the markets for loans.2 These assumptions allow us to compactly write the











where St is the total household labor-market income (or the individual￿ s income if s/he is single),
￿t is the expected price of the contingent claim, and W is bequest net of inheritance.3 We assume
that ￿t is distributed according to the known distribution F￿(￿t+1 j ￿t).
2.1.1 Frisch Demand for Consumption and the Indirect Utility
The additive and intertemporal separability of consumption along with the complete assets markets
assumption allow us to characterize the Frisch Demand for consumption separately from the labor-
supply decisions. Let ￿i denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint in






for all t 2 f0;1;2:::g and i 2 fw;mg. Let Si￿t(ht;:) be the salary paid to an individual that works
ht hours in occupation ￿ in period t. We can now write the current-period utility as
(4) Uit = dtui0(zt;￿t) + ui1(lt;zt) + ￿￿t
P
￿2fP;NPg
I￿tSi￿t(ht;:) + (1 ￿ dt)"0t + dt"1t;
reducing the individual problem to making the labor-supply decisions, at.
2Other papers that use similar assumptions include Altug and Miller (1990, 1998), Card (1990), Mace (1991),
Townsend (1994), and Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko⁄ (1996).
3See Altug and Labadie (1994, p. 305) for a formal derivation of the budget constraint under these assumptions.
4Note that ￿i is also the inverse of the Pareto weight in the planner￿ s problem.
62.2 Firms
Technology Each ￿rm in each occupation produces output (y￿t) using labor (ht) and a homo-
geneous capital (K￿t) augmented by human capital and a skill index, which is a function of the
worker￿ s production-relevant variables, zP
t . These variables are a subset of zt and include the
labor-market history and other variables that a⁄ect the productivity. Each occupation is subject
to aggregate productivity shocks to the e⁄ective unit of capital; therefore, the law of motion of the
e⁄ective unit of capital is
(5) K￿t = K￿t￿1 + 4￿t;
where 4￿t is identically and independently distributed over time. Speci￿cally, production at time
t in occupation ￿ is given by
y￿t = Y￿(ht;zP
t ;K￿t):
Output in each occupation is the sum of output produced by the ￿rms. The output in each
occupation, y￿t; is measured in terms of the relative prices of the occupation products.
There are employer-speci￿c hiring costs. These costs capture all possible training, administra-
tive and other net costs associated with hiring a new worker. We assume that within occupations
the costs are the same for all employers, and denote them by ￿￿.
We de￿ne a job as the number of hours worked for a given worker￿ s characteristics, zP
t , and
assume that each job is o⁄ered in one occupation only. Speci￿cally, a ￿rm in occupation ￿ o⁄ers a
contract for hours h to a worker with characteristics zP
t only if the expected lifetime net productivity
is greater than it is in the other occupation,
(6) Y￿0(ht;zP
















s ;K￿0s) ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ I￿s￿1)
￿
We also assume that YPt(ht;zP
t ;KPt) and YNPt(ht;zP
t ;KNPt) cross only once and that Y￿(ht;zP
t ;K￿t)
is twice continuously di⁄erentiable. Hence, for every occupation ￿ and worker￿ s characteristics, zP
t ,
there is a range of hours o⁄ered in this occupation, h ￿ (h￿t(zP
t ;K￿t);h￿t(zP
t ;K￿t)). Therefore, a
choice of hours implies an occupation choice. Because not all hours are o⁄ered in each occupation,
some changes in hours worked may involve changing occupation. This assumption captures the
limited ￿ exibility of hours o⁄ered within some occupations.
State Variables Following Rust (1987), we separate the systematic observed state variables from
the idiosyncratic unobserved variables, and assume that they are conditionally independent of each
other. Let the observed state variables, !t, be de￿ned as !t = (zt;￿t;￿￿t;KPt;KNPt). Note that
the third element, ￿￿t, is the marginal utility of wealth.
7Timing At the beginning of each period, the state variables !t and ("0t;"1t) are realized. The
workers then make participation, occupation, and hours decisions. Observing workers￿choices,
￿rms simultaneously o⁄er salaries to each worker. Workers observe the o⁄ers and choose a ￿rm.
Finally, production occurs and the agents consume. This structure repeats itself every period.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Symmetric Information
Assume that the information is symmetric and that the workers and ￿rms observe !t and ("0t;"1t).
Workers and ￿rms can only commit to one-period non-contingent contracts. A contract, Si￿t(ht;!t),
consists of a salary, schedule of hours and worker￿ s characteristics. Let ￿￿t denote the continuation
























The only di⁄erence between the expected pro￿ts from a worker who is already working in the ￿rm
and a new worker is the hiring costs. Since workers are price takers, we can derive the optimal
salary schedule by backward induction. The net revenue from hiring a worker in the ￿nal period,
T, is Y￿(hT;zP
T ;K￿T)￿￿￿. Because of the free-entry assumption, the salary is derived by equating
the potential employer￿ s pro￿t with zero,
(9) ￿￿T = Y￿(hT;zP
T ;K￿T) ￿ Si￿T(hT;!T) ￿ ￿￿ = 0:
Therefore, the current employer in period T earns a rent of ￿e
￿T = ￿￿. Next, consider an o⁄er to
a worker with characteristics !T￿1 in period T ￿ 1, and de￿ne pi￿t+1(ht;!t) to be the probability
that the worker will remain in the ￿rm in period t+1 given the information set available in period
t. The salary in period T ￿ 1 is again derived by equating the outside employer￿ s expected pro￿t
over the two periods to zero,
(10) ￿￿T￿1 = Y￿(hT￿1;zP
T￿1;K￿T￿1) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ Si￿T￿1(hT￿1;!T￿1) + ￿pi￿t+1(ht;!t)￿e
￿T = 0:
We obtain the competitive salary schedule by substituting ￿e
￿T = ￿￿,
(11) Si￿T￿1(hT￿1;!T￿1) = Y￿(hT￿1;zP
T￿1;K￿T￿1) ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿￿pi￿T(hT￿1;!T￿1):
8Therefore, by induction, we obtain the competitive salary schedule,
(12) Si￿t(ht;!t) = Y￿(ht;zP
t ;K￿t) ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿￿pi￿t+1(ht;!t);
for all ht 2 (h￿t;h￿t). The per-period net surplus that a worker generates after the ￿rst year
of employment is Y￿(ht;zP
t ;K￿t) ￿ Si￿t(ht;!t) = ￿￿. The current employer￿ s share each period
is ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿pi￿t+1(ht;!t), and the worker￿ s share is ￿￿￿pi￿t+1(ht;!t). Because labor markets are
competitive, the worker￿ s discounted expected lifetime earnings are equal to the worker￿ s expected
net output in an outside ￿rm.
Equilibrium Labor Supply Let V1i and V0i denote the ex-ante conditional valuation functions
associated with the decisions to work and not to work, respectively. The ex-ante conditional
valuation function is de￿ned as























1 if V1i(!t) + "1t ￿ V0i(!t) + "0t
0 otherwise:
The probability of participation conditional on !t is
(15) po
i(!t) = E[do
i j !t] =
Z V1i￿V0i
￿1
("0t ￿ "1t)dF1("0t;"1t) ￿ Q(V1i(!t) ￿ V0i(!t)):
Using the Bellman principle, the ex-ante conditional valuation of participation is
(16) V1i(!t) + "1t = max
ht;fItg￿2fP;NPg




+ ￿Et [pi(!t+1)V1i(!t+1) + (1 ￿ pi(!t+1))V0i(!t+1)] j !t;dt = 1g
and for non-participation it is
(17) V0i(!t) + "1t = ui1(1;zt) + ￿Et [pi(!t+1)V1i(!t+1) + (1 ￿ pi(!t+1))V0i(!t+1)] j !t;dt = 0g:
9Next, we characterize the optimal hours and occupation decisions beginning with the optimal hours
choice h￿























[V1i(!t+1) ￿ V0i(!t+1)] j !t;ht = h￿
it;I￿t = 1
￿
and the occupation choice is given by
(19) I0
i￿(!t) ￿ Ifh￿t < h￿
it(!t) < h￿tg.
Notice that equation (18) is obtained by maximizing separately over each open interval (h￿t;h￿t)
and then choosing the occupation that yields the highest expected life-time utility. Under the
assumption in (6), any choice of hours, ht, conditional on zt maps into a unique occupation choice
in period t implying equation (19). The occupation choice a⁄ects the probability of working in the





The optimality conditions in Equations (16)￿ (19) describe the current and intertemporal trade-
o⁄s between consumption and non-market hours. If the hiring costs were zero, the third term on the
left hand side of equation (18) would be zero, reducing it to the intertemporal labor supply decisions
considered by Polacheck (1981) and Altug and Miller (1998). The left hand side of Equation (18)
describes the standard e⁄ect of an extra hour￿ s work on the trade-o⁄ between current utility from
non-market hours and consumption. The marginal change in salary includes, in addition to the
increase in output, the e⁄ect on future participation in the occupation, illustrating the new source
of dynamic self-selection. The right hand side of equation (18) demonstrates the dynamic e⁄ect
of a marginal change in hours on the probability of participation and the continuation values of
working and not working, through the e⁄ect on labor market experience and non-market hours.
Labor market experience a⁄ects the future productivity of workers whereas the stock of non-market
hours a⁄ects the future disutility from working.
3.2 Asymmetric Information
Now assume that the worker observes both !t and ("0t;"1t), but the ￿rms only observed !￿
t which
is a subset of the worker￿ s state variables !t, and do not observe the iid shocks to the utility,
("0t;"1t). Similarly let x￿
t denote a subset of xt that the ￿rms observe; therefore the vector of
information the ￿rms observe is !￿
t = (a0;:::;at￿1;KPt;KNPt;x￿
t). We assume that all production-
relevant variables, zP
t , are observed. To make the complete-assets-markets assumption consistent
with private information, we assume anonymous trades in the assets markets.
10This information structure transforms the model into a signaling game. Hence, we use the
perfect Bayesian equilibrium in this section of the model. At the beginning of each period, ￿rms
form a (common) set of prior beliefs on each individual worker￿ s type, ￿it(!t j !￿
t). Upon observing
the worker￿ s labor-market actions, at, ￿rms update their beliefs about each worker￿ s type. We
denote the posterior beliefs by e ￿it(!t j !￿
t;at). Notice that e ￿it(!t j !￿
t;at) is used to form the
prior beliefs in period t + 1 because the types are persistent over time and evolve according to
F0i(!t+1 j !t;at).
De￿nition 3.1 (Equilibrium) A perfect Bayesian equilibrium consists of labor-market strategies,
￿it, Frisch demand for consumption, co
it, the workers￿contract-o⁄er choices, fSi￿tg￿2fP;NPg and a
common belief system such that:
1. Each player￿ s strategy is optimal given that player￿ s beliefs and other players￿strategies.
2. The posterior beliefs, e ￿, satisfy Bayes￿rule when possible,
(21) e ￿it(!t j !￿
t;at) =
￿it(!t j !￿




and, for all histories, types and actions,
e ￿it(!t j !￿
t;at) = e ￿it(!t j !￿
t;b at) if at = b at:
3. At the beginning of period t+1, ￿rms form priors about the worker￿ s type in that period based
on past history:
(22) ￿it+1(!t+1j!￿
t;at) =fi0(!t+1 j !t;at)e ￿it(!t j !￿
t;at):
Existence is nontrivial in the model because within each period, we have the classic adverse
selection problem (as formulated by Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). As pointed out by Hellwig
(1987), this nonexistence result is sensitive to the timing of the players￿moves. In our model,
workers move ￿rst deciding how much to work, and then the ￿rms make o⁄ers for these hours; the
workers then choose which o⁄er to accept. This di⁄erence in timing transforms the within-period
game from a screening model into a signaling game, and the nonexistence result of the original
Rothschild￿ Stiglitz model is broken. The proposition below establishes existence.
Proposition 3.1




t ;K￿t) ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿￿e pi￿t+1(ht;!￿
t):
Under asymmetric information the workers￿optimal strategies are as described in the sym-
metric information case except for the following changes in the optimal labor-supply and
11consumption decisions: The salaries in the state variables entering the valuation functions in
equations (13) - (19) are now replaced by the salary in equation (23).






and the optimal salary in equation (23) in which the employers￿beliefs satisfy the consistency
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t;at)d!t+1:
To highlight the di⁄erence asymmetric information makes, consider the ￿rst-order condition for


































@ht . When the information is
asymmetric, a marginal change in the amount of hours worked changes the employers￿beliefs on
the worker￿ s type. These beliefs are a function of the current and past history of labor-supply
decisions. The current choice of hours, therefore, has a dynamic e⁄ect on the future valuation
functions on the right-hand side of equation (25) through the change in the publicly observed state
variables, !￿
t+1. As is standard in dynamic adverse selection models without commitment, the e⁄ect
of current actions on future salary o⁄ers gives rise to the ratchet e⁄ect. The ratchet e⁄ect occurs
because, for a low attachment type, revealing information on !t reduces the future expected rents
(contract o⁄ers), thus, providing incentives to ￿pool￿and hide the private information (a dynamic
adverse selection model with similar features is analyzed in La⁄ont and Tirole (1988)). Notice that
participation and occupation choices have similar signaling elements as they a⁄ect !￿
t+1 in a similar
way.
The optimal contract provides insurance to the risk-adverse workers; hence it dominates con-
tracts which impose all the risk on the workers. Therefore, selling the job to the worker, with
partial commitment or without commitment, is not optimal when the workers are risk averse and
the employers are risk neutral. While some partial-commitment contracts, such as those requir-
ing that the worker makes a transfer upon leaving the job, may ameliorate the adverse-selection
problem, they do not fully solve it (see for example Dionne and Doherty, 1994). We choose not
to allow for partial-commitment contracts for two reasons. First, these termination transfers are
not observed in the data. Second, if it is possible to write the long-term contract as a sequence
of spot contracts in which a payment is made every period, our contract would be observationally
equivalent.
12Labor-Market-Outcome Gender Gaps In the model, gender di⁄erences in labor-market
outcomes can arise due to preference and productivity di⁄erences. In our model, the distribution
of xt a⁄ects the utility function and is gender speci￿c. Even if a man and a woman have the same
characteristics and the information is symmetric, a di⁄erence in the distribution of xt a⁄ects the
probability of participation, and therefore the earnings. This gender di⁄erence in salaries can, in
turn, give rise to di⁄erences in labor-supply decisions, and therefore, human capital of men and
women.
When the information is asymmetric, statistical discrimination provides an additional source of
gender earnings gaps. Women who have high probability of remaining in the ￿rm may face lower
earnings than men with a lower probability because, on average, women with similar observable
characteristics are more likely to leave than men. The model may also give rise to discriminatory
equilibria because of the possibility of multiple equilibria, even if ex-ante there are no di⁄erences
between men and women of a given cohort.5
Change in the Gender Gap The following changes in exogenous factors could account
for the narrowing in the observed gender earnings gap over time: occupation-speci￿c aggregate
productivity, demographic characteristics, costs of participation, and education. Suppose that
women￿ s participation costs are larger than men￿ s, and suppose that there is an increase in the
overall productivity within an occupation. Such an increase a⁄ects the earnings of all workers
because Y￿(ht;zP
t ;K￿t) increases. If males￿participation rate is high relative to women￿ s, it is
possible that women￿ s human capital will increase more than men￿ s, leading to a reduction in the
gender earnings gap. The relative increase in women￿ s participation can cause a relative increase
in employers￿beliefs, further reducing the gender earnings gap. Demographic changes, such as a
decline in fertility, and a decline in the cost of producing home goods can have a similar e⁄ect on
the change in the patterns of female labor market participation and the gender earnings gap.
An additional factor that the asymmetric information introduces and can account for the nar-
rowing gender earnings gap is changes in beliefs across cohorts. While the equilibrium is charac-
terized for each cohort separately, we observe in the data several overlapping cohorts allowing us
to quantify the di⁄erence in employers￿beliefs across cohort.
4 Empirical Implementation
The theoretical model is written and solved for a single cohort; the empirical implementation, how-
ever, uses data from a number of overlapping cohorts. A cohort is characterized by the year of birth
and years of completed education. The large number of cohorts in the data makes it undesirable
to enumerate all the cohorts; instead, we note that there is a one-to-one mapping between a cohort
and age, current year and years of completed education. The functions that depend on cohort are
the transition function of the time varying characteristics, Fi0(xt+1 j zt), and the employers beliefs,
5See Tirole (1996) for a dynamic-adverse-selection and statistical-discrimination model. The di⁄erence between
this model and Tirole￿ s arises because the matching in Tirole￿ s model between ￿rms and workers is random.
13e pi￿t+1(ht;!￿
t). These two functions depended on age and years of education; to make them depend
on cohorts we add a year dummy. These functions are estimated nonparametrically using kernel
density estimation.
The private information we use in the estimation consists of data that the econometrician
observes as well as persistent heterogeneity which is unobserved to the econometrician. To select
which variables are private information, we ￿rst choose variables which are not observed by potential
employers and the worker is not obligated to report truthfully by law.6 We then develop a test
for private information which allows us to test the assumption that these variables are private
information. The persistent unobserved heterogeneity is the inverse of the Pareto weights (￿i)
that enter the Frisch demand for consumption. It depends on the family budget constraint and
is therefore private information by nature. We estimate this persistent unobserved heterogeneity
in a ￿rst stage as ￿xed e⁄ect, and use it in the ￿nal stage as if the econometrician observes
it. This estimation procedure is possible because of the additive separability of consumption and
non-market hours in the per-period utility speci￿cation (see section 5 for more details). Below, we
describe the data and parametric assumptions we make about the model￿ s underlining primitives.
4.1 Data
This paper uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) because it includes a long panel of
matched data on individuals￿working, marriage and child birth histories for overlapping cohorts.
The two main disadvantages of using the PSID is the lack of nonfood consumption and good job-
to-job￿ transition data. As a result, job switches in the data are occupation changes and transition
in and out of the labor force.7
The data is taken from the Family File, the Childbirth and Adoption History File, the Retrospec-
tive Occupation File, and the Marriage History File of the PSID. The sample contains individuals
who were either the Head or Wife of a household in the year of the interview. Individuals are
classi￿ed into two occupation categories, professional and nonprofessional. We only keep White
individuals between the ages of 25 and 65 in our sample. After eliminating those with missing val-
ues, we are left with 15,702 individuals between the years 1968 and 2007 of which 46% are women.
However, we only have annual labor-market data for the years 1968 to 1997. The construction of
our sample and the de￿nitions of the variables are described in greater details in Appendix C
The average annual earnings for men increased by roughly 58% over the period, from $40,000
per year in year-2000-constant dollars in 1968, to $63,000 in 1997. Meanwhile, the average annual
earnings for women increased by around 113% over the same period, from $16,200 in 1968 to
$34,000 in 1997. As Figure 2 shows, the earnings gap declined by around 19% (10%) in professional
(nonprofessional) occupations over the period. Note that the earnings gap is normally 50% larger
than the wage gap because women not only earn less, but work fewer hours per year than men. We
6Notice that while the PSID survey data are readily available, the speci￿c individual information recorded in them
is anonymous and cannot be obtained by potential employers.
7This is consistent with the equilibrium job turnover in our model in which workers do not change employers
within an occupation.
14therefore, focus on the earnings gap in order to capture both dimensions.
Table 1 contains summary statistics of our main labor-market and human-capital variables. The
participation rate for men is relatively constant over the sample period with a slight decline toward
the end. In contrast, the participation rate for women increased signi￿cantly, from 54% in 1968 to
76% in 1997. The average annual hours worked by men is also relatively constant, but the average
annual hours worked by women increased by roughly a third, from 1,400 hours per year in 1968
to 1,868 hours in 1997. Although the hours-worked gap between women and men has narrowed
signi￿cantly, it remains large. The gender gap in the average years of completed education has
almost completely closed by 1997.
Women￿ s representation in the professional occupations increased by roughly 64% over the
sample period, going from 28% of the occupation in 1968 to around 46% of the occupation by 1997.
At the same time, the fraction of women in the nonprofessional occupations remained constant over
the period.
Table 2 contains summary statistics of our main demographic and wealth variables. The sample
includes the household size and the age distribution and number of children. Both the household
size and number of children declined, but the decline in the number of young children is the most
pronounced. Roughly 80% of our ￿nal sample is married in any given year of the sample.
Our measure of consumption is food consumption. Food consumption expenditures for a given
year is obtained by summing the values of annual food expenditures for meals at home, annual food
expenditures for eating out, and the value of food stamps received for the year. Household food
consumption has declined over the period while the per capita food consumption has increased.
4.2 Consumption
Following the literature on the estimation of the consumption Euler equation (see Browning and
Lusardi, 1996, for a survey), we use the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function:
(26) ui2(cnt;xnt;"2nt) = exp(x0
ntB4 + "2nt)c￿
nt=￿;
where 1￿￿, the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, must be positive in order for the utility function
to be concave. The function exp(x0
ntB4 +"2nt) is e⁄ectively an adult equivalence scale; it is used in
the literature to get around the problem that consumption is typically measured at the household
level, but the object of interest is the marginal utility of consumption at the individual level.




We take logs and get a log-linearized Euler equation:
(28) lncnt = x0
nt(1 ￿ ￿)￿1B4 + (￿ ￿ 1)￿1 ln￿n + (￿ ￿ 1)￿1 ln￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿1"2nt
15This equation captures, in a simple and parsimonious way, several important features of our
model worth noting. x0
nt captures changes in the individual circumstances over the life cycle. There-
fore, if an individual changes households (e.g., marriage, divorce), the individual Pareto weights
￿￿1
n would be identi￿ed assuming that the utility functional form is invariant across these di⁄er-
ent household con￿gurations controlling for x0
nt. The above condition also captures implicitly the
intertemporal substitution (the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is (￿￿1)￿1), precautionary-
saving and bequest motives.
4.3 Production Function
The output for occupation ￿ in year t measured in relative prices is speci￿ed as
(29) Y￿(hnt;zP





r=1 b￿4rdnt￿r + b￿5agent
+ b￿6age2
nt + b￿7agent ￿ educationn + ￿n;
where ￿n is an individual e⁄ect ￿xed across occupations and time. The aggregate shock to produc-
tivity, K￿t, enters the production function linearly, capturing the relative increases in productivity
or changes in the relative prices of goods produced in an occupation. We allow for the possibility
of nonlinearity in the productivity of current and past hours. This speci￿cation was chosen for its
strong support in the empirical literature (see, among others, Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989; Altug
and Miller, 1998). It implies that human capital is general in nature but has occupation-speci￿c
returns.
4.4 Utility from Non-market Hours
Following the literature, we assume that the idiosyncratic preference shocks, ("0nt;"1nt), are dis-
tributed as a Type I extreme value with variance parameter ￿2 and mean zero. This distributional
assumption for the preference shocks implies that the inverse of the E[d0
i j !t] is given by
(30) Q￿1(po
i(!t)) = ￿ ln[po
i(!t)=(1 ￿ po
i(!t))];
and the expected values of the shocks, given the state and decisions, have the following forms
(31) E["0t j !t;do




￿ ￿ ln[(1 ￿ po
i(!t))]
and
(32) E["1t j !t;do






where ￿ is the Euler constant.
We parametrize the cost of working to include a linear additive aggregate shock that does not
depend on gender, non-separability in past participation, and gender di⁄erences in the e⁄ect of the
16observed time-varying characteristics. It takes the form of





The speci￿cation of the utility from non-market hours follows the literature on non-separable utility
(see, among others, Hotz, Kydland, and Sedlacek, 1988; Altug and Miller, 1990; Becker, Grossman,
and Murphy, 1994) but allows the e⁄ect to di⁄er by gender. Speci￿cally, we assume the following
functional form.






This speci￿cation allows for concavity in current hours (i.e., ￿i0 < 0) and for past and current hours
to be either compliments or substitutes (i.e., ￿is > 0 or ￿is < 0).
4.5 State Variables
A large state space is a major di¢ culty in estimating dynamic programming models. The literature
typically addresses this problem by either restricting the agent￿ s observed state variables or by
assuming functional forms of the production and utility functions that limit their dependence on
past decisions. We can only partially adopt these strategies, however, because our model is a
signaling game and past decisions are central to modeling reputation. Speci￿cally, in a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, the beliefs depend on all past decisions, not just on those relevant to the
payo⁄s (i.e., utility and output). In order to make the estimation feasible and at the same time
capture the signaling content of past decisions, we restrict the beliefs to depend on the complete
labor-market history in the past three years and the total number of years worked in the occupation.
This restriction, along with the Markovian assumption on the transition of the exogenous variables,
allows the model to satisfy the stationarity property called ￿nite state dependence.
A decision process is said to exhibit ￿nite state dependence if there exists a ￿nite sequence of
future decisions that lead to the same state variables irrespective of what decision is taken today.
This property can be illustrated with the following example. Consider two individuals making the
discrete decisions to work or not to work in two consecutive years. Suppose that the state variables
are restricted to include only the number of years of experience, and that both individuals have
￿ve years of experience in the current period. Suppose individual A works in the current period
and does not work in the next period while individual B does not work in the current period
but works in the next period. Entering the next period, individual A has six years of experience
while individual B has ￿ve years of experience. At the beginning of the third period, however,
both individuals have six years of experience. This decision process is said to exhibit ￿nite state
dependence since the two di⁄erent decision sequences (work, not work) and (not work, work) will
result in both individuals having the same work experience entering the third period, irrespective
17of the decision today. This de￿nition can be generalized to account for stochastic transition of the
state variables. In that case, a decision process is said to exhibit stochastic ￿nite state dependence
if there exists a ￿nite sequence of future decisions that leads to the same distribution of the state
variables irrespective of what decision is taken today.
5 Estimation and Identi￿cation
One of the main problems in estimating game-theoretic models is the possibility of multiple equilib-
ria. Multiple equilibria induces indeterminacy in standard estimation criterion functions that maps
the structural parameters of the model to the observed distribution in the data. One solution the
literature proposes is based on the following intuition. Conditional on other players￿equilibrium
strategies, each player￿ s decision becomes a single-agent maximization problem (i.e., the best re-
sponse function). This maximization problem is a necessary condition which holds in all equilibria;
hence, an estimator of the structural parameters, based on this necessary condition, will be well
de￿ned if the model is identi￿ed.
A model is identi￿ed if we can show that the structural parameter vector, ￿, with the true
population value ￿￿ can be written as a functional of the conditional distribution of the observable
variable. In addition, that functional has to return the value ￿￿ in all the admissible structures of
the model (see Chesher, 2007, for more details). We show below that our model is identi￿ed and
develop an estimator that gets around the problem of multiple equilibria. In the online appendix
we show that our identi￿cation results are more general, and that the model is semiparametrically
identi￿ed.
5.1 Identi￿cation
The assumption that the utility function is additively separable in non-market hours and con-
sumption is necessary for identi￿cation. Using the variation in consumption over time, across
individuals and across di⁄erent household con￿gurations, allows the identi￿cation of the Pareto
weights ￿￿1
n (unobserved heterogeneity) and the aggregate price of consumption ￿t from equation
(28).
The production functions and hiring costs are identi￿ed from the variation in salaries across
occupations and gender for individuals with di⁄erent patterns of future labor supply (i.e., propen-
sity to change occupation, labor-market participation and amount of hours worked). We assume
that the unobserved individual-speci￿c e⁄ect, ￿n, is correlated with all the time-invariant pub-
licly observed variables such as gender and completed education, but not with the time-varying
variables (see Mundlak, 1961, 1978; Chamberlain, 1984). Taking the expectation over ￿n of the
zero-pro￿t condition transforms the earnings equation into a partial linear-panel-data model, where
the nonlinear part is the expected value of ￿n conditional on the time-invariant publicly observed
variables. We can now use standard panel-data transformations to show that the time-varying
production function parameters and the hiring cost are identi￿ed. We then use the individual-level
18zero-pro￿t condition to identify the individual-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects. Appendix B contains a detailed
description of this result.
Each equilibrium generates speci￿c conditional choice probabilities. In principal, any set of
observed choices in the data could be generated by a mixture of di⁄erent equilibria. Following the
literature on estimation of games, we assume that conditional on observed characteristics,8 the data
is generated by only one equilibrium (see Bajari, Benkard, and Levin, 2007; Aguirregabiria and
Mira, 2007; Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, 2008). Under this assumption, the conditional choice
probabilities are identi￿ed. Notice, however, that this assumption allows for di⁄erent equilibria to
be played across di⁄erent cohorts and across di⁄erent types of workers.
The utility from non-market hours is identi￿ed from the variation in the hours worked, labor-
force participation and occupation choices made over time given di⁄erent salaries. This identi￿ca-
tion result relies on the above assumptions on the equilibrium selection, and the stochastic ￿nite
state dependence of the state variables. To set some notation, let !
(s)
kt denote the state in period
t + s if, at time t, the kth option is taken￿ that is, dt = k￿ and the decisions along the ￿nite
sequence that leads to the same state variable are taken in the following s periods. Denote by p
(s)
kit,
the probability that dt+s = 1 conditional on !
(s)








. Then the optimal
participation decisions described in equation (15) and the hours Euler equations, (18) and (25)
(depending on whether information is symmetric or asymmetric) become


























































where E[mijt] = 0 for j 2 f2;3g. These equations are obtained by applying the Hotz and Miller
(1993) inversion and the alternative valuation-function representation to the participation equation
(15), and hours Euler equations, (18) or (25), in Altug and Miller (1998). Appendix B derives the
above equations. By inspection, the model is identi￿ed once the consumption and salary equations,
the beliefs and the conditional choice probabilities are identi￿ed.
5.2 Estimation
Consumption We estimate equation (28) using standard panel-data estimation techniques. We
estimate the marginal utility of wealth, (1 ￿ ￿)￿1￿n, for each individual in our sample. Because
8Observable characteristics are either characteristics directly observed in the data or characteristics that can be
identi￿ed from the data separately, like the individual ￿xed e⁄ects in production and consumption.
19the standard ￿xed-e⁄ect estimates (used in Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980) are biased for small T,
we use consumption data for the period 1969￿ 2007; these consumption data are available annually
for the years 1998￿ 2008. We are unable to use data for the years after 1997 to estimate the rest of
the model because other variables needed for the estimation are not available annually.
Equilibrium Beliefs, Their Derivatives and Conditional Choice Probabilities The equi-
librium beliefs for each occupation, e pin￿t+1, are computed as a nonlinear regression of the product
of the next-period participation and the occupation choice index, dnt+1 ￿ In￿t+1, on the current-
period￿ s publicly observed state variables and hours worked, hnt, conditional on working today in
occupation ￿. The nonparametric estimates of e pin￿t+1, denoted by e pN
in￿t+1, are computed using the
kernel estimator. We then estimate their derivatives using the standard nonparametric-derivative
kernel estimator (see Pagan and Ullah, 1999).
In contrast to the beliefs, the conditional choice probabilities are de￿ned from the workers￿
perspective and not the employers￿ . The elements included in xnt are the number of individuals in
the family unit, the number of children younger than three, the number of children between three
and fourteen, age, years of completed education, marital status, spouse￿ s years of education, and
gender. The conditional choice probabilities, pint, are computed using nonlinear regressions of the
participation index, dnt, on the current state-variables vector, !N






the superscript N denotes an estimated quantity.
Estimation of the Finite-State Path Probabilities and their Derivatives We ￿rst charac-
terize all the di⁄erent possible sequences of choices that can lead to the same labor-market history
at a certain point in time due to the assumption of ￿nite state dependence. The hypothetical















NYn￿t￿1+s = NYn￿t￿1 + In￿t
for s = 1;2;3. The vector z
(s)
1nt is the state vector of an individual in period t+s, with a state vector
znt￿1 at period t who chooses to work in period t making optimal hours and occupation choices and
then chooses not to work in the s ￿ 1 periods following period t. Similarly, the vector z
(s)
0nt is the
state vector of an individual with characteristics vector znt￿1 entering period t after choosing not
20to work in period t, but choosing to work in period t+1; the hours and occupation choices in period
t + 1 are the same as the optimal hours and occupation choices the individual would have made in
period t if s/he worked. For the following s￿2 periods after period t+1, this individual chooses not
to work. Notice that these two sequences of decisions will lead to the same labor-market history in
period t + 4. Assuming a Markovian transition of the variables xnt, the decision sequences satisfy
the stochastic ￿nite state dependence assumption. Let us de￿ne the following participation indices














0nt take the value 1 if the individual entering period t has followed a decision












k = f0;1g be the empirical counterpart of the hypothetical state. Recall that p
(s)
kit = E[dt+s j
!
(s)
kt ]; hence, it can be estimated as nonlinear regressions of the participation index, dnt, on the
hypothetical state, !
(s)N
knt , conditional on d
(s)
knt = 1. We then evaluate the term @p
(s)
i1nt=@hnt, using
the standard nonparametric derivative kernel estimator (Pagan and Ullah, 1999).
Earnings Equations We estimate the parameters of the earnings equations using the speci￿ca-
tion of the production function, the assumption that employers observe the occupation and hours
choices in the past three years as well as the total number of years worked in each occupation. We
derive a moment condition using the assumption of the free-entry condition. From the free-entry
condition, the expected lifetime pro￿ts of an employer from each contract is zero, conditional on











where ￿w￿ denotes the (7+T)-dimensional vector of parameters we estimate. Using equation (38),
we obtain a set of orthogonality conditions which can be exploited to estimate ￿w￿ using standard
panel data techniques of optimal instrumental variables or two-stage least squares.
Utility of Non-market Time The remaining parameters are estimated by GMM using the em-
pirical counterpart of equations (34) and (35). They are constructed by substituting the estimated







@hnt . The remaining details of the implementation, the






@hnt , and the asymptotic properties of the estimator are in
the sections A3 and A4 in the online appendix.
216 Empirical Results
The estimation results are shown in Tables 3 through 6 and Figures 1 through 3. The results from
the earnings equation are reported in Table 4, and Table 6 reports the non-market hours utility
parameters, the risk-aversion parameter, and the variance of the idiosyncratic preference shocks;
these results are consistent with the empirical regularities that women sort more into nonprofes-
sional occupations, spend more hours on non-market activities and accumulate less human capital
than men. The estimates of the aggregate productivity shocks in professional and nonprofessional
occupations are consistent with the increase in women￿ s representation in professional occupations
over time.
We show that the symmetric and asymmetric information models are nested and reject the
hypothesis that the data were generated by the symmetric-information model. We then show
that the asymmetric-information model accurately predicts the gender earnings gap, age￿ earnings
pro￿les, and the changes in the gender earnings gap over time and over the life cycle. Figures 2
and 3 show the ￿t of the model in several dimensions.
6.1 Earnings Equations
Asymmetric Information, Speci￿cation and Goodness-of-Fit Tests We begin by devel-
oping a three-step test of the asymmetric information. Under the hypothesis that the information
is symmetric, the zero-pro￿t condition implies that Et[mn￿t(￿w￿) j !t;i;dntIn￿t = 1] = 0; under
the asymmetric-information hypothesis: Et[mn￿t(￿w￿) j !￿
t;i;dntIn￿t = 1] = 0. Under asymmetric
information, the employers have a subset of the information available to them under symmetric in-
formation. Therefore, if the model is identi￿ed under asymmetric information, the variables which
are assumed to be private information serve as overidentifying restrictions under the null hypothesis
that the information is symmetric. This leads to a natural nested test of both models using the
standard J-test in an optimal GMM setting.
In the ￿rst step, the overidentifying restrictions test rejects the earnings equation speci￿cation
under symmetric information (the J-statistic is 76.3). That is, it rejects the hypothesis that the
production function takes the functional form we speci￿ed and that the variables Number of in-
dividuals in the Household, Number of Kids, Martial Status, Marginal Utility of Wealth, Spouse
Labor-Market Income and Spouse Education are included in the information set of the employer.
In the second step, we perform an overidentifying restrictions test for the earnings equation
under the null that the information is asymmetric. There are di⁄erent overidentifying restrictions
built into the asymmetric information model; as noted in the identi￿cation section, we only need
one of the exclusion restrictions, gender or cohort, to achieve identi￿cation. Using as instruments
￿ve years of labor-market histories, gender and cohort, we were not able to reject the overidentifying
restrictions.
Since the production function is similar under symmetric and asymmetric information, the only
di⁄erence between the two speci￿cations of the earnings equation is the information structure.
22Rejecting the information structure in the symmetric information case is not su¢ cient to show that
this information is private. These variables should only be included in the information set of the
employer if they a⁄ect pro￿ts. In the third step, we test and con￿rm that these variables predict
future occupation participation. We can, therefore, conclude that the earnings equation speci￿ed
under the symmetric information assumption is rejected because the variables above a⁄ect the
employers￿pro￿ts yet they are not priced. For the rest of the paper, we use the asymmetric model;
we estimate the earnings equation using both a two-stage least squares (2SLS) and an optimal
GMM. The results are identical so we only present the 2SLS results below.
We assess the model￿ s ￿t by looking at how well it predicts three important features of the
data: the (unconditional) evolution of the gender earnings gap over the life cycle and its evolution
over the life-cycle conditional on continuously working full time, the age￿ earnings pro￿les, and the
change in the gender earnings gap over time. Figure 2 shows that the model does a good job in
predicting the trend in the gender earnings gap over time. Figure 3 shows that the model predicts
well the increase in the gender earnings gap over the life cycle, and its decline for men and women
who work continuously full-time. The main force driving the ￿rst result is the increase gender
gap in human capital, while the latter is driven by the faster increase in earnings of women who
consistently work full time relative to men￿ s.
Parameter Estimates The estimation results in Table 4 reveal comparatively larger returns
to experience in professional occupations, faster depreciation of human capital in nonprofessional
occupations, and a larger hiring cost in professional occupations. For example, the returns to
working full time (40 hours per week) versus part-time (20 hours per week) in the previous year
are $2,751 in professional occupations versus $2,284 in nonprofessional occupations; this di⁄erence
is larger for experience accumulated with a two-year lag. The cost of hiring a new worker (the
discount factor is assumed to be 0.95) is $4,502.65 in professional occupations versus $3,174.74 in
nonprofessional occupations. The three factors we describe above a⁄ect occupational sorting. To see
that, consider a male and a female choosing an occupation, and suppose that the female￿ s probability
of an employment-spell interruption and her time spent on non-market activities are larger than the
male￿ s. The salary cost in occupation ￿ caused by the hiring costs and probability of interruption of
employment spells, ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿e pi￿t+1(ht;!￿
t)), is comparatively lower in nonprofessional occupations.
In addition, the depreciation rate of human capital is higher in the nonprofessional occupations.
The returns to labor-market experience, however, are larger in professional occupations. Thus,
women, in equilibrium, are more likely to sort into nonprofessional occupations, which penalize
interruption of employment spells less, despite the lower returns to experience. Men, on the other
hand, accumulate more human capital, and have less frequent interruptions of employment spells
than women; this reduces the salary cost associated with the hiring costs, and therefore, they
are more likely to sort into professional occupations. Consistent with other studies (see Card
and DiNardo, 2002; Lee and Wolpin, 2010), Figure 1 reveals a signi￿cant increase in aggregate
productivity in professional occupations since the mid 80s, and a smaller increase in the 90s in
23nonprofessional occupations; these ￿ndings are consistent with women￿ s increase in representation
in professional occupations.
Other Source of Discrimination Our model captures statistical discrimination linked to the
probability of future interruption of the employment spell. There are two other notable types of
discrimination we do not consider: Becker￿ s taste-based discrimination, and statistical discrimina-
tion linked to unobserved productivity (see Coate and Loury, 1993). In its simplest form, Becker￿ s
model would imply a ￿xed di⁄erential wage for men and women; if taste does not change over
time, it should appear as a gender gap in our individual-speci￿c productivity estimates. The sec-
ond form of discrimination can a⁄ect our estimates in the following way. Suppose that there are
unobserved productivity gender di⁄erences, and suppose that education is used as a costly signal of
productivity; then employers would pay workers their expected productivity given their education.
In our sample, however, education level does not change over the life cycle; therefore, this form of
discrimination should appear in the individual-speci￿c productivity estimates.
Table 5 shows the regression results of the unobserved individual-speci￿c e⁄ects on education
and gender. The results reveal that the coe¢ cient on the male dummy is negative, hence ruling
out a taste-based discrimination in its simplest form. The coe¢ cient on the interaction of the
male dummy and education is positive, however, indicating that there is a gender di⁄erential in
the compensation for a given education level. This ￿nding is consistent with the hypothesis that
the education signal of productivity is di⁄erent for males and females. This e⁄ect, however, is not
large.
6.2 Utility of Non-market Time
Before we proceed, it is worth noting that we cannot reject the overidentifying-restrictions test for
the participation and hours Euler equations. As in other studies that used the PSID and assume
additive separability of consumption and non-market hours (see Zeldes, 1989; Lawrence, 1991; Shea,
1995; and among others), our estimate of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is ￿1:01 (i.e.,
￿1=(1￿￿)), but is not statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. That is, we can not reject that
the utility takes the log form; this result is presented in column (3) in Table 6.
Reviewing Column (1) in Table 6 shows that there is no clear trend in the cost of participation
over time; this is in contrast to the results in Greenwood, Seshardri, and Yorukoglu (2005); our
time period, however, does not completely overlap with theirs. Reviewing Columns (2) and (3)
of Table 6 reveals that there is a signi￿cant non-separability in both the disutility of working
and the marginal utility of non-market hours, and these patterns di⁄er by gender. For example,
there are signi￿cant complementarities between current and previous year￿ s participation and non-
market hours for women; we do not ￿nd these complementarities in participation for men. These
￿ndings are consistent with Becker￿ s (1965) theory of home-production division of labor and habit
formation. Kids and marriage have the expected e⁄ect on the cost of participation and the utility
from non-market hours for women, with young kids increasing the cost of participation and older
24kids increasing the utility from non-market hours for women; we ￿nd that the opposite holds for
men.
6.3 Dynamic Decomposing Gender Gap
Why Is There a Gender Earnings Gap? To quantify the e⁄ect of labor-market frictions
and asymmetric information on the observed gender earnings gap, labor supply, and occupation
composition, we simulate the model with no hiring cost and with symmetric information. Under
these two scenarios, the model has a unique equilibrium which can be found by backward induction.
We compare the outcomes in each scenario to the observed outcomes in the data, which are assumed
to be generated by the model with asymmetric information. In the model with no hiring costs, wages
are the marginal productivity. Therefore, the gender labor-market di⁄erences in the model with no
hiring costs are driven by di⁄erences in preference and skills only; the di⁄erence in the labor-market
outcomes gender gap between the no-hiring-costs scenario and the observed data is therefore due to
labor-market frictions. We then compare the outcomes of the model with symmetric information
to the observed outcomes in the data and quantify the extent to which the gender gap is due to
statistical discrimination. These results are presented in Figure 4 and Tables 7 and 8.
Figure 4 reveals that, on average, 70% of the earnings gap is due to hiring costs and about
48% is due to statistical discrimination in professional occupations. This is because, in the regime
with no hiring cost and under the symmetric information regime, the earnings gap would have been
12% and 19%, respectively, instead of the 40% our model predicts.9 Repeating the exercise for
nonprofessional occupations reveals that 44% of the earnings gap is due to hiring costs and about
13% is due to statistical discrimination. Tables 7 and 8 show that, under both counterfactual
regimes, women would have participated less in the labor force, but those who participate would
have worked more hours. These results suggest that the asymmetric information a⁄ects the selection
of women into the labor market; on the margin, women with higher costs of participation participate
more. This is because participation provides a signal that the woman is more ￿attached.￿That is,
the returns to labor-market participation are larger due to the reputation e⁄ect. Thus, the decline
in the earnings gap relative to the symmetric information and frictionless-markets regimes is also
due to the selection of women with either higher productivity or lower costs of participation into
the labor markets.
What Caused the Changes in the Gender Earnings Gap? In order to examine the sources
of the decline in the gender earnings gap over time, we decompose it into the following factors:
human capital, beliefs and other (i.e. unobserved productivity, and age￿ education cohort composi-
tion). This is done using the estimated earnings equation. To quantify the e⁄ect of each of these
factors, we hold it at the 1972:1978 median levels, allowing all other factors to change. Figure 5
reveals that the decline in the gender gap in human capital almost entirely explains the decline
9Figure 4 shows that under no-hiring cost regime the average median female to male earnings ratio is 88%. The
gap is therefore 12%. The average predicted earnings gap over these three time periods is 40%. Therefore, the gap
associated with labor-market frictions is 28/40. The other calculations are conducted in the same way.
25in the gender earnings gap; the gender earnings gap would not have declined much if the human
capital gap remained at its 1970s level. Changes in beliefs had a smaller e⁄ect, and the exogenous
factors (other) had the smallest e⁄ect on the observed decline in the gender earnings gap. Since
human capital is endogenous in the model, it is a⁄ected by discrimination. We therefore use our
model to quantify the e⁄ect of the di⁄erent factors on the change in human capital.
We face the standard problems of solving games with multiple equilibria under counterfactual
regimes: First, it is not clear that one can ￿nd all the possible equilibria, and second, it may not
be possible to select which equilibrium will be played. Fortunately, we can get around this problem
because when there are no hiring costs the model has a unique equilibrium. When there are no hiring
costs, wages are the marginal productivity, and therefore, all the changes in labor-supply decisions
are driven by changes in demographics, participation cost shocks, and productivity shocks. We can
therefore quantify the e⁄ect of changes in these factors on changes in human capital by holding each
factor at the 1970s levels and allowing all other factors to change. Human capital is measured using






We then calculate the gender gap in this index, and decompose its changes over the three time
periods.
Similarly, to examine the e⁄ect of changes in beliefs over time, we can solve the model under
the symmetric information regime. Performing this counterfactual analysis allows us to quantify
the e⁄ect of changes in beliefs on human capital. Changes in beliefs over time and cohorts capture
the e⁄ect of social and norm changes on the gender earnings gap and labor-market participation;
our analysis, therefore, complements the work by FernÆndez (2007), Fogli and Veldkamp (2007)
and FernÆndez and Fogli (2009), which models explicitly the causes of these changes. The results
of this decomposition are presented in Table 9. They reveal that labor-market frictions (hiring
cost) and asymmetric information amplify the e⁄ect of gender di⁄erences in preferences and skills,
and are jointly responsible for roughly 50% of the change in human capital in both occupations
and time periods; hiring cost accounts for the majority of this change. Social changes, through
their e⁄ects on beliefs, account for roughly 13% of the change. The other major source of change
is demographics, including changes in education, fertility and marriage, and accounts for about
30% of the decline in the human capital gender gap. Finally, the e⁄ect of productivity shocks
is more important in professional than in nonprofessional occupations. Overall, we ￿nd that the
demand-side factors played a greater role than the supply-side factors in the decline of the labor-
market outcomes gender gaps and greater than found in the literature (see Lee and Wolpin, 2010,
for example); the main reason for this di⁄erence is that we account for the endogenous e⁄ect of
discrimination.
7 Conclusion
This paper ￿nds that the most important factor a⁄ecting the gender earnings gap is the gender
di⁄erences in human capital accumulated in both the labor market and at home. The paper
26quanti￿es the contribution of di⁄erent factors that a⁄ected the gender earnings gap. We ￿nd that
while di⁄erences in preferences and skills are important, asymmetric information has a large e⁄ect.
In addition, we ￿nd that changes in discrimination patterns between the 70s and the 90s had a
large e⁄ect on the decline in the gender gap in human capital, and hence on the gender earnings
gap.
Because our model nests the symmetric information case, we propose a test for the existence
of asymmetric information. There is a large literature on testing for asymmetric information and
adverse selection, and there is no consensus regarding the importance of it in the labor markets or
in other markets. While some papers ￿nd the existence of private information to be statistically
signi￿cant, it is not always quantitatively important. Our test is statistically signi￿cant, and we
are able to show that asymmetric information is quantitatively important to the existence of the
gender earnings gap.
One source of the changes in the earnings gap has been the decline in the education gender gap.
While education is exogenous in our model, we ￿nd evidence suggesting it is an important issue
to be further explored. Importantly, the paper ￿nds evidence that educated males earn more than
females after accounting for statistical discrimination and human capital di⁄erences. This suggests
that education choice and education signaling may have a role in the observed gender earnings gap
and the changing patterns in the education gap. This is beyond the scope of this paper and is left
for future research.
A Theoretical Results Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1. We establish optimally of the players￿strategies below. We begin
with a description of the o⁄-equilibrium-path beliefs, and assign belief of a type (which is equivalent
to the private information vector of characteristics) to choices which are not optimal and are not
observed on the equilibrium path.
Assumption A.1 Let !￿t(!￿
t) be the type with the lowest costs of working and highest returns (both
current and future expected) given the observable characteristics !￿
t; this type will work the most
hours in occupation ￿. Similarly, de￿ne !￿t(!￿
t) to be the type with the highest disutility from hours
worked and lowest returns given the observable characteristics !￿
t (this type also works the smallest
fraction of time in the occupation). Let ￿￿ = ￿it(!￿t j !￿
t) be the beliefs (probability assigned to
this type by employer) about the type !￿t(!￿
t), and ￿
￿ = ￿it(!￿t j !￿
t) be the beliefs about the type
!￿t(!￿
t). Suppose that 8!t, ￿it(at j !t) = 0, then ￿it(!t j !￿
t) = ￿
￿ if ht < h￿t and ￿it(!t j !￿
t) = ￿￿
if ht > ht￿.10
Lemma A.1 Given any choice of hours, a worker accepts the contract with the highest salary. An
employed worker remains with the current employer if there is a tie. If not employed, the worker
randomizes between identical o⁄ers.
Proof of Lemma A.1. An increase in salary enters the value function through the Frisch demand
10If the optimal hours have full support for any given observable characteristics, then there is no o⁄-equilibrium-path
analysis for hours.
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Since ￿￿t > 0, the current utility is increasing in Si￿t(ht;!￿
t). We need to show that given any beliefs
and any ht, the continuation value of the worker is non-decreasing in salary. To see that, recall
that given the hours choice, one occupation is chosen (by assumption). Changing employers within
an occupation with the same hours worked does not change the beliefs. Furthermore, we assume
that salary is not observed by outside employers; hence, it is not part of employment history and
does not a⁄ect beliefs. Therefore, the continuation value is non-decreasing in salary, and accepting
the highest salary given hours is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3.1 (1). We begin with the workers￿equilibrium strategies. Notice
that the decision-theoretic solution to optimal consumption, c0
t, is an optimal response given the
contracts o⁄ered on the equilibrium path by construction. It is also the optimal consumption
behavior o⁄ the equilibrium path. An optimal consumption strategy response to a one-period
unanticipated salary shock is also an optimal response to a single deviation by employer. Thus, the
optimal consumption plan in equation (3) is optimal.
Next we show that the labor-supply decisions, a0
t, are optimal. Using the Bellman principle,
the ex-ante value function for an individual who chooses to participate in the labor force in pe-
riod t and behaves optimally thereafter is given by equation (13). Equations (13)￿ (19) describe
the necessary conditions for optimality on-the-equilibrium-path once the salary schedule in the
symmetric-information case in equation (12) is replaced with the optimal salary schedule in the
asymmetric-information case described in equation (23).
Since this is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we need to show optimality of the strategies o⁄
the equilibrium path. By Assumption A.1, workers who work fewer (more) hours than the minimal
(maximal) hours are compensated according to the beliefs component attached to the marginal
type who works the least (most) hours, !￿t(!￿
t) (!￿t(!￿
t)). By construction, the costs and bene￿ts
from working more than h￿t(!￿
t) or less than h￿t(!￿
t) are suboptimal given the on-equilibrium-path
strategies and beliefs; because the beliefs component will not increase payo⁄s beyond working h￿
or h￿, such deviations cannot strictly increase payo⁄s.
Next, we show that the contract described in equation (23) satis￿es the zero-pro￿t condition
and is optimal. Equation (23) is derived from the zero-pro￿t condition using backward induction.
We derive it the same way we derive equations (7)￿ (12) for the symmetric-information case; the
only di⁄erence is that the employer￿ s information set is now !￿
t instead of !t.
In order to establish optimality, we need to show that given that other ￿rms o⁄ering the com-
petitive rate, the worker￿ s strategy, and the ￿rm￿ s beliefs, there is no single unilateral pro￿table
deviation from the competitive rate that strictly increases the expected pro￿ts. First, we show that
by o⁄ering a lower salary, the ￿rm cannot increase its pro￿t. From Lemma A.1, workers accept the
highest o⁄er; thus, a deviation to a lower salary implies the worker rejects the o⁄er and the payo⁄
is zero. Notice that by assumption ￿rms cannot credibly commit to pay above the market rate in
the future.
Consider a ￿rm o⁄ering a salary e Si￿t for ht such that e Si￿t > S0
i￿t(ht;!￿
t). The worker￿ s state
variables, !t; are not a function of past salaries. Therefore, at t + 1, the worker￿ s state variable




i￿t+1(!t+1) and hit+1(!t+1) also remain the same. To see that the current salary does not change
future labor-supply decisions note that the function Q() is only a function of ("0t;"1t) by Lemma
1 of Hotz and Miller (1993). Hence, it is not a⁄ected by current salary. Also, because of the
additive separability of leisure and consumption, the complete-assets￿ markets assumption and the
assumption that the workers move ￿rst (announcing hours), the functions V1it+1() and V0it+1()
remain the same.
Given that past salaries are not observed by outside employers, the beliefs, ￿it+1(!t+1 j !￿
t+1),
are unchanged. Therefore the probability of participation next period remains unchanged:
e pi￿t+1(ht;!￿
t j e s￿t) =
Z
Q(!t+1)I0
i￿(!t+1)fi0(!t+1 j !t;at)e ￿it(!t j !￿
t;at)d!t+1 = e pi￿t+1(ht;!￿
t)
Since we only need to check for a single deviation (after which the employer follows the optimal



























Hence, there is no unilateral pro￿table deviation from the competitive salary schedule.
Proof of Proposition 3.1 (2). The optimality of the strategies described in the ￿rst part of
the proposition is only a subset of the necessary conditions for existence of equilibrium. Next, we
establish a set of (further) necessary and su¢ cient conditions for existence of equilibrium in our
model. Note that the optimal hours worked and participation is a function of the ￿rms￿beliefs about
the next period￿ s participation. To see this, consider the beliefs about period T￿ s participation:
(40) e pi￿T =
Z
Q(!T)I0
i￿(!T)fi0(!T j !T￿1;aT￿1)e ￿iT￿1(!T￿1 j !￿
T￿1;aT￿1)d!T:
Recall that !T￿1 and hence e pi￿T are a function of the labor-market history a0;:::aT￿1. However a0
T￿1,
the equilibrium labor-market decisions, are a function of the sequence e pi￿T;:::; e pi￿2. Therefore, e pi￿T
is de￿ned as an implicit function of itself. In fact, there is a triangular system of implicit equilibrium
beliefs of the following form.
e pi￿T = ￿iT(e pi￿T;:::; e pi￿2)
e pi￿T￿1 = ￿iT￿1(e pi￿T￿1;:::; e pi￿2)
. . .
e pi￿2 = ￿i2(e pi￿2); (41)
where ￿it is the RHS of equation (24).
Corollary A.1 A necessary and su¢ cient condition for existence of equilibrium is that there exist
a ￿xed point in fe pi￿2;:::; e pi￿Tg
￿2￿
i2fw;mg of the system of equations in equation (41) for all ￿ and i.
29Proof of Corollary A.1. In order to prove this, we ￿rst show necessity. Suppose there exists
an equilibrium in which equation (41) does not have a ￿xed point. Then take any t, ￿; and i. The
probability of a worker remaining in the ￿rm at t + 1 is either higher or lower than e pi￿t+1. By
equation (23) and because on the equilibrium path the beliefs are consistent, the zero-expected-
pro￿t condition holds. Since e pi￿t+1 is not equal to the probability of next-period participation, the
zero-pro￿t condition is violated. Hence, this state cannot constitute an equilibrium.
Next we show su¢ ciency. Suppose equation (41) has a ￿xed point. Then, for any t, ￿; and i
by part 1 of the proposition, the competitive salary schedule exists. Given the competitive salary
schedule, the worker￿ s strategies for hours, participation, occupation, and consumption exist and are
unique. Hence conditions 1, 2, and 3 of De￿nition 3.1 hold (mutual best responses by construction,
the beliefs satisfy Bayes￿law).
Existence of equilibrium in our model is established by showing that there exists a ￿xed point
to the system of equations in (41).
Proof of Existence. Given the triangular nature of the system of equations in (41), it is su¢ cient
to show existence for each equation in its own variable.
Existence of a solution to the worker￿ s consumption and hours problem follows immediately
from continuity and strict concavity of the utility function, and the fact that there is a solution to
the worker￿ s problem for any set of contracts o⁄ered. Next, note that for any period t, occupation










e ￿it(!t j !￿
t;at)d!t: (42)
Here we only make explicit the arguments of interest. Note that e pi￿t+1 : [0;1], and that the
left-hand side is also de￿ned on the compact interval [0;1]. Hence by Brouwer￿ s ￿xed-point theo-
rem, continuity of the RHS in e pi￿t+1 su¢ ces to guarantee a solution to each one of the equations
separately.
To show continuity, recall that !￿t+1 is the marginal type for which h￿
￿t+1(!t+1) ￿ h￿t+1, and
!￿t+1 is the type for which h￿
￿t+1(!t+1) ￿ h￿t+1. Note that h￿
it+1(!t+1) is continuous and invertible
in !t+1 as the utility function is continuous and di⁄erentiable. Thus, we can write, h￿1
￿t+1(!t+1)
=!￿t+1 and !￿t+1 ￿ h
￿1
￿t+1(!t+1). Since Ii￿t+1(:) is an indictor function, we can rewrite the inner
integral as Z !￿t
!￿t+1
fi0(!t+1 j !t+1)Qt+1()d!t+1:
Since ht(e pi￿t+1) is continuous in e pi￿t+1 and Q(ht(e pi￿t+1);:) is continuous in ht, we only need to show
that the functions h￿1
￿t+1 and h
￿1
￿t+1 are continuous in e pi￿t+1. From the continuity of the production
function in each occupation in all factors of production, h￿t+1 and h￿t+1 are continuous in ht and
ht(e pi￿t+1;:) is continuous in e pi￿t+1. Hence, their inverses are continuous in e pi￿t+1. Therefore, there
exists a solution to every period￿ s beliefs separately.
The fact that there exists a one-to-one mapping between the posterior beliefs and the implied
participation probability in equation (42) comes directly from the equilibrium requirement that
the beliefs satisfy Bayes￿rule; this condition holds by construction. Therefore, the expected pro￿t
condition on salary is also correct on the equilibrium path.
30B Identi￿cation
B.1 Derivation of the Non-market-Hours Moment Condition
Combining equations (15), (30), (31) and (32) with the ex-ante valuation function (13) allows us
to write the ex-ante equilibrium value function for any initial state !:

















































































A proof of this representation can be found in Altug and Miller (1998).
Next, we characterize, using the above, the necessary conditions for equilibrium (participation
and hours). First, we characterize the equilibrium relationship from (15). Substituting the above










































Note that all the elements from period 4 onward are the same irrespective of whether action 1 or
0 is taken today by stochastic ￿nite state dependence. Hence, they fall out of the above equation
and we get equation (34). Similarly, using above ex-ante function representation, the necessary
































Note that, again by stochastic ￿nite state dependence, all the elements from period 4 onward fall
out of the above equations and this gives us equation (35).
31B.2 Salary Equation Identi￿cation
Consider the optimal salary under asymmetric information.11 Combining equations (23) and (29),
(45) S￿(hnt;!￿





r=1 b￿4rdnt￿r + b￿5agent
+ b￿6age2
nt + b￿7agent ￿ educationn + ￿n ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿￿e pi￿t+1(hnt;!￿
nt):
Integrating out ￿n gives us
(46) E[Si￿(hnt;!￿
nt) j hnt;f!￿








+ b￿5agent + b￿6age2
nt + b￿7agent ￿ educationn + E[￿n j i;educationn]








ntn￿ng] and e pi￿t+1(hnt;f!￿
ntn￿ng) = E[e pi￿t+1(hnt;!￿
nt)
j hnt;f!￿
ntn￿ng]. We now get
(47) Si￿(hnt;f!￿





r=1 b￿4rdnt￿r + b￿5agent
+ b￿6age2
nt + b￿7agent ￿ educationn + ￿n ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿￿e pi￿t+1(hnt;f!￿
ntn￿ng):
Since both S￿(hnt;f!￿
ntn￿ng) and e pi￿t+1(hnt;f!￿
ntn￿ng) are identi￿ed from data, equation (47)
is a standard panel-data model with unobserved e⁄ect ￿n. Thus, under standard assumptions,
(K￿t;b￿1;:::b￿7;￿￿;￿￿￿) are identi￿ed. Integrating equation (45) over all the information except ￿n
gives
(48) E[Sin￿ j ￿n] = E[K￿t] + b￿1E[hnt j ￿n] + b￿2E[h2
nt j ￿n] +
P￿
r=1 b￿3rE[hnt￿r j ￿n]
+
P￿
r=1 b￿4rE[dnt￿r j ￿n] + b￿5E[agent j ￿n] + b￿6E[age2
nt j ￿n]
+ b￿7E[agent ￿ educationn j ￿n] + ￿n ￿ ￿￿ + ￿￿￿E[e pi￿t+1 j ￿n]
Note that each of the components that are conditional on ￿n is identi￿ed by looking at the same
individual over time. Therefore, ￿n is identi￿ed.
C Data Description
We used data from the Family File, the Childbirth and Adoption History File, the Retrospective
Occupation File, and the Marriage History File of the PSID. The Family File contains a separate
record for each member of each household included in the survey in a given year, but includes
labor income, hours worked, and years of completed education only for Heads and Wives. The
Childbirth and Adoption History File contains information collected in the 1985￿ 2007 waves of
the PSID regarding histories of childbirth and adoption. The ￿le contains details about childbirth
and adoption events of eligible people living in a PSID family at the time of the interview in any
wave from 1985 through 2007. Each set of records for a speci￿ed individual contains all known
cumulative data about the timing and circumstances of his/her childbirth or adoption experience up
to and including 2007, or those waves during that period when the individual was in a responding
11All the arguments remain the same in the symmetric-information case.
32family unit. If an individual has never had any children, one record indicates that report. Note
that eligible refers individuals of childbearing age in responding families. Similarly, the 1985￿ 2007
Marriage History ￿le contains retrospective histories of marriages for individuals of marriage-eligible
age living in PSID families between 1985 and 2007. Each set of records for a speci￿ed individual
contains all known cumulative data about the timing and circumstances of his/her marriages up
to and including 2007, or those waves during that period when the individual was in a responding
family unit.
Our sample selection started from the Childbirth and Adoption History File. We then drop
any individual who was in the survey for four years or less. We then drop all individuals who were
older than 65 in 1967, and then drop all individuals that were less than 25 years old in 2007. We
then drop all individuals who were neither Head nor Wife in our sample for at least four years.
There were coding errors for the di⁄erent measures of consumption in the PSID from which we
construct our consumption measure. In particular, our measure of food consumption expenditures
for a given year is obtained by summing the values of annual food expenditures for meals at home,
annual food expenditures for eating out, and the value of food stamps received for the year. We
measured consumption expenditures for year t by taking 0:25 times the value of this variable for
the year t￿1 and 0:75 times its value for the year t; this step accounts for the fact that the survey
questions used to elicit information about household food consumption were asked sometime in the
￿rst half of the year, while the response is dated in the previous year.
The variables used in the construction of the measure for total expenditures are also subject
to the problem of truncation described above because the way they are coded in the 1983 PSID
data tapes. The truncation value for the value of food stamps received for that year is $999.00;
the relevant value for this variable in the subsequent years and for the value of food consumed at
home and eating out is $9,999.00, however. We also use variables describing various demographic
characteristics of the individuals in our sample. The dates of birth of the individuals were obtained
from the Child Birth and Adoption ￿le.
The race of the individual and the region of residence at the time of the interview were obtained
from the Family portion of the data record. We de￿ned the region variable as the geographical
region in which the household resided at the time of the annual interview. This variable is not coded
consistently across the years. For 1968 and 1969, the values 1 to 4 denote the regions Northeast,
North central, South, and West. For 1970 and 1971, the values 5 and 6 denote the regions Alaska
and Hawaii and a foreign country, respectively. After 1971 a value of 9 indicates missing data, but
no person-years data were lost due to missing data for these variables. We also drop all observations
of individuals coded as living in regions 5 and 6.
We used the family variable Race of the Household Head to code the race variable in our study.
For the interviewing years 1968￿ 1970, the values 1 to 3 denote White, Black, and Puerto Rican or
Mexican, respectively; the value 7 denotes other (including Asian and Philippino), and 9 denotes
missing data. For 1971 and 1972, the third category is rede￿ned as Spanish-American or Cuban
and between 1973 and 1984, just as Spanish American. After 1984, the variable was coded in such
a way that 1￿ 6 correspond to the categories White, Black, Hispanic, American Indian, Aleutian
or Eskimo, and Asian or Paci￿c Islander, respectively. A value of 7 denotes the other category, a
value of 9 denotes missing data. We used all available information for all the years to assign the
race of the individual for years in the sample when that information was available. We then drop
all individuals that were not coded as White.
The marital status of a woman in our subsample was determined from the Marriage History
File. The number of individuals in the household and the total number of children within that
household were also determined from the family-level variables of the same name. In 1968, a code
for missing data (equal to 99) was allowed for the ￿rst variable, but in the other years, missing
33data were assigned. The second variable was truncated above the value of 9 for the interviewing
years 1968 and 1971. After 1975, this variable denotes the actual number of children in the family
unit. Household income was measured from the PSID variable, Total Family Money Income, which
included taxable income of Head and Wife, total transfers of Head and Wife, taxable income of
others in the family units and their total transfer payments.
We used the PSID Retrospective Occupation File to obtain a consistent three-digit occupational
code for our sample. First we eliminated all self-employed, dual-employed, government workers,
Farmers and Farm Managers, Farm Laborers and Farm Foremen, Armed Forces, and Private House-
hold workers. The professional occupation is made up of the following classi￿cations: Professional,
Technical, and Kindred Worker; Managers and Administrators, Except Farm Managers; and some
categories of Sales Workers. The Sales Workers included in professional occupations are Advertising
and Salesmen, Insurance Agents Brokers and Underwriters, and Stock and Bond Salesmen. The
nonprofessional occupation consists of the following classi￿cations: Sales Workers (not included in
Professional); Clerical and Kindred Workers; Craftsmen and Kindred workers; Operatives, Except
Transport; Transport Equipment Operatives; Laborers, Except Farm; and Service Workers, Except
Private Household.12
We used two di⁄erent de￿ ators to convert the nominal quantities such as average hourly earn-
ings, household income, and so on to real values. First, we de￿ned the (spot) price of food consump-
tion to be the numeraire good at t in the theoretical section. We accordingly measured real food
consumption expenditures and real wages as the ratio of the nominal consumption expenditures
and wages, and the annual chain-type price de￿ ator for food consumption expenditures published in
Table t.12 of the National Income and Product Accounts. On the other hand, we de￿ ated variables
such as the nominal value of home ownership or nominal family income with the chain-type price
de￿ ator for total personal consumption expenditures.
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37Table 1: Summary of Labor-Market and Human-Capital Variables
Participation Hours Earnings Fraction of Women Education



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. Earnings in thousands of year-2000 US$.
38Table 2: Summary of Demographic and Wealth Variables
Food Family Number of Kids Marital







































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. Household Income and Food Consumption in thousands of year-2000 US$





Number of Individuals Living in the Household 0:226￿￿￿
(0:00367)
Number of Kids Between Age 6 and 14 in the Household ￿0:136￿￿￿
(0:00565)
Number of Kids Between Age 0 and 5 in the Household ￿0:181￿￿￿
(0:00573)
Northeast Regional Dummy 0:0842￿￿
(0:0415)
South Regional Dummy ￿0:0846￿￿￿
(0:0306)







Number of id 15702
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data from PSID, each regression also includes yearly dummies.
40Table 4: 2SLS Estimates of Earnings Equation. Dependent Variable: Average Weekly Earnings, 1970￿ 1996
Variables Prof Nonprof
Hours Worked 20:23￿￿￿ 12:63￿￿￿
(1:200) (0:469)
Hours Worked Squared ￿0:156￿￿￿ ￿0:0736￿￿￿
(0:0141) (0:00640)
Hours Worked Lagged 2:645￿￿￿ 2:196￿￿￿
(0:292) (0:107)




Age Squared ￿0:559￿￿￿ ￿0:252￿￿￿
(0:0564) (0:0170)
Age X Years of Completed Education 0:997￿￿ 1:328￿￿￿
(0:402) (0:205)
Dummy = 1 if Worked Last Year ￿16:59 ￿28:01￿￿￿
(14:06) (6:995)
Dummy = 1 if Worked Two Years Ago ￿50:66￿￿￿ ￿15:84￿￿￿
(13:22) (5:639)
Prob. of Working Next in Occupation 82:26￿￿￿ 58:00￿
(23:21) (37:27)





Number of id 5600 10271
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. Data from PSID, each regression also includes yearly dummies.
Table 5: OLS Estimates of Individual-Speci￿c E⁄ects from Earnings Equation. Dependent Variable: Fixed
E⁄ect
Variables Prof Nonprof
Male Dummy ￿51:42￿￿￿ ￿5:843
(18:06) (15:64)
Years of Completed Education ￿150:3￿￿￿ ￿165:7￿￿￿
(6:322) (5:686)
Years of Completed Education Squared 5:426￿￿￿ 6:194￿￿￿
(0:233) (0:220)






Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.
41Table 6: GMM Estimates Utility Function. Moment Conditions: Hours Euler Equation and Labor-Market
Participation Equations










Time E⁄ect (1) Participation Cost (2) Marginal Utility of Leisure (3)
1974 0:429￿￿￿ Constant ￿11:30￿￿￿ Constant 0:671￿￿￿
(0:122) (0:345) (0:0128)
1975 ￿0:110 Individuals in Household ￿0:0894￿￿￿ Individuals in Household 6:93e￿05
(0:116) (0:0211) (0:000362)
1976 ￿0:00819 Kids Age 0 to 5 ￿1:308￿￿￿ Kids Age 0 to 5 ￿0:000429
(0:109) (0:142) (0:00220)
1977 0:147 X Male Dummy 0:128 X Male Dummy ￿0:0126￿￿￿
(0:105) (0:149) (0:00228)
1978 ￿0:454￿￿￿ Kids Age 6 to 14 0:110 Kids Age 6 to 14 0:00778￿￿￿
(0:104) (0:0882) (0:00116)
1979 ￿0:163￿ X Male Dummy ￿0:682￿￿￿ X Male Dummy ￿0:0164￿￿￿
(0:0989) (0:0941) (0:00125)
1980 0:0407 Age 0:734￿￿￿ Age 0:000385
(0:0986) (0:0164) (0:000262)
1981 ￿0:0723 Age Squared ￿0:00893￿￿￿ Age Squared ￿5:50e￿06￿
(0:0968) (0:000196) (3:15e￿06)
1982 0:0101 Years of Education 0:163￿￿￿ Years of Education ￿0:00792￿￿￿
(0:0971) (0:0198) (0:000386)
1983 0:0203 X Male Dummy 0:224￿￿￿ X Male Dummy ￿0:00120￿￿￿
(0:0978) (0:0252) (0:000430)
1984 0:0228 Marital Status Dummy ￿1:093￿￿￿ Marital Status Dummy ￿0:0692￿￿￿
(0:0967) (0:326) (0:00536)
1985 0:232￿￿ X Male Dummy ￿15:77￿￿￿ X Male Dummy ￿0:0412￿￿￿
(0:0973) (0:345) (0:00202)
1986 0:0490 Years of Education of Spouse ￿0:263￿￿￿Years of Education of Spouse 0:00542￿￿￿
(0:0961) (0:0126) (0:000101)
1987 ￿0:0571 X Male Dummy 0:774￿￿￿ X Male Dummy ￿0:00476￿￿￿
(0:0943) (0:0295) (0:000276)
1988 ￿0:114 Part. Dummy last year 4:712￿￿￿ Squared ￿0:00429￿￿￿
(0:0922) (0:104) (5:62e￿05)
1989 ￿0:338￿￿￿ X Male Dummy ￿4:846￿￿￿ X Leisure Last Year 0:000935￿￿￿
(0:0906) (0:167) (5:67e￿05)
1990 ￿0:199￿￿ Part. Dummy Two Years Lagged 0:0548 X Male Dummy 0:000971￿￿￿
(0:0994) (0:0894) (5:80e￿05)
1991 ￿0:0233 X Male Dummy 0:761￿￿￿X Leisure Two Years Lagged 0:000811￿￿￿
(0:103) (0:172) (4:49e￿05)
1992 0:0384 X Male Dummy ￿0:000505￿￿￿
(0:107) Risk Aversion 0:01 (5:84e￿05)
1993 0:281￿￿ (0:012) Inverse of Variance of Shock 0:000665￿￿￿
(0:121) Observations 80986 (7:69e￿05)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.
42Table 7: Participation and Occupation Composition
Women Participation
Source 1974:1978 1984:1988 1992:1996
Raw 62 70 72
Hiring Cost 56 62 61
Private Information 51 57 56
Fraction of Women
Professional
Raw 34 40 45
Hiring Cost 30 35 37
Private Information 28 38 41
Nonprofessional
Raw 48 48 47
Hiring Cost 42 40 41
Private Information 45 46 45
Table 8: Average Annual Hours Worked
Professional
1974:1978 1984:1988 1992:1996
Source Women Men Women Men Women Men
Raw 1;640 2;201 1;904 2;226 1;902 2;297
Hiring Cost 1;975 2;017 2;057 2;098 2;049 2;087
Private Information 1;813 2;088 1;980 2;090 1;988 2;120
Nonprofessional
1974:1978 1984:1988 1984:1988
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Raw 1;424 1;998 1;635 2;117 1;773 2;184
Hiring Cost 1;580 2;000 1;790 2;060 1;820 2;076
Private Information 1;510 1;970 1;640 1;930 1;768 1;897







(Median Women Value over Median Men Value (%))
1974￿ 1978: 1984￿ 1988: 1992￿ 1996
Professional Nonprofessional
Source 1984￿ 1988 1992￿ 1996 1984￿ 1988 1992￿ 1996
Hiring Cost 38 37 30 29
Private Information 12 13 13 14
Demographic 28 25 38 39
Home Production Shock 2 1 1 1
Production Shock 18 22 11 10
43Figure 1: Aggregate Occupation-Speci￿c Productivity Shocks
44Figure 2: Gender Earnings Gap Data and Model Predicted
45Figure 3: Wage Gap and Wage-Age Pro￿les
46Figure 4: Counterfactual Decomposition of Gender Earnings Gap
47Figure 5: Decomposition of the Change in Gender Earnings Gap
48